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Arbitrability and Public Policy: An African Perspective 
 
Joseph Mante* 
 
Growth in international trade has led to considerable expansion of the scope of matters 
capable of settlement by arbitration. In spite of sustained scholarly activity on 
arbitrability, the question of what is arbitrable remains controversial but relevant in 
many regions of the world, including Africa. Arbitrability has the potential to affect the 
validity of an arbitration agreement, strip an arbitrator of jurisdiction or derail 
enforcement of an award. Given the significance of the concept, it is vital that entities 
involved in international transactions do not speciously extrapolate knowledge of what 
pertains in Europe and America across all jurisdictions and regions of the world. This 
study draws a comparison between arbitrability and its relationship with public policy 
in Europe and America on one hand, and the trend in Africa in an attempt to critically 
investigate the extent to which African states are willing to extend the scope of 
arbitrable subject-matters. A number of trends on arbitrability are discernible. Most 
commercial disputes are arbitrable and this observation generally aligns with practice 
in Europe and America. Beyond this, there are three significant differences in the areas 
of scope of subject matter, approaches to arbitrability regulation and the role of public 
policy.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation and the expansion of international trade have led to a 
considerable expansion of the scope of commercial matters which are capable 
of settlement by arbitration. This development notwithstanding, the concept of 
arbitrability remains a controversial but an important subject. The international 
impact and dynamics of arbitrability has made it an important subject for 
discussion in international commercial arbitration.1  The concept has the 
potential to affect the validity of an arbitration agreement, strip an arbitrator of 
jurisdiction to determine a matter in spite of party agreement or derail 
enforcement of an award.2   It is therefore not surprising that after years of 
                                                            
* LLB, LLM, PhD (Construction Dispute Resolution).  A lawyer of over ten years’ experience in Property, Contract and 
Commercial law practice in Ghana, West Africa and currently, a lecturer at the Law School, Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen, Scotland. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 106th Annual Conference of the Society of 
Legal Scholars held at York, United Kingdom where it received nomination for the Best Paper Award. The author 
wishes to thank Dr Dania Thomas, Dr Andrey Kotelnikov and Dr Leon Moller for their invaluable comments on earlier 
drafts. The author also acknowledges the support of Prof. Ken Mackinnon, Prof. Issaka Ndekugri and Mr. David 
Christie.  
1 See Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International 1999).  
2 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, 1958 (the New York Convention), 
Article V (2) (a); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006) (the 
UNCITRAL Model Law) Article 34 (2) (b) (i). 
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scholarly work on the subject, there are still concerns with the concept of 
arbitrability.  
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention) and the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, 1985 (as amended in 
2006) (the UNCITRAL Model Law) leave the determination of the issue of what 
subject matters are arbitrable to individual States. Historically, States have 
made such determinations on the basis of considerations such as public policy, 
which in turn, is dictated by several other factors including economic, political, 
social and cultural demands.3 There is evidence that in Europe and America, 
the effect of public policy as a determinant of what is arbitrable is waning.4 The 
implication is that public policy is no longer a bar to arbitration but remains one 
of the legal considerations at the award stage or during enforcement of the 
award. It also signals a further widening of the scope of matters which are 
arbitrable.  
Relying on relevant literature and arbitration laws, this study draws a 
comparison between arbitrability and its relationship with public policy in Europe 
and America on one hand, and the trend in Africa in an attempt to critically 
investigate the extent to which States in Africa are willing to extend the scope 
of subject-matters capable of resolution by arbitration. This study is important 
for a number of reasons. First of all, it is imperative that foreign entities involved 
in transnational commercial transactions in Africa become aware that the scope 
of subjects which are arbitrable in Europe are not necessarily the same as those 
in the African jurisdictions where they may be transacting business. In selecting 
arbitration as a preferred dispute resolution method, parties need to be aware 
of the extent to which disputes which arise out of their respective transactions 
will be arbitrable. Secondly, it is important that parties seeking to enforce their 
awards in a jurisdiction in Africa are aware of possible challenges under the 
New York Convention as a result of the relatively distinct scope of what may be 
arbitrable in the African context. Finally, there is a gap in the literature on the 
African perspective of arbitrability generally and the role of public policy in the 
determination of what is non-arbitrable.  
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides a brief 
overview of the concept of arbitrability. The second section surveys the current 
trend and relationship between arbitrability and public policy in the European 
and American contexts. This is followed by an examination of the trend in Africa. 
Under this third section, approaches to the regulation of international arbitration, 
                                                            
3  See Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
international arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.114. 
4 McLaughlin, Joseph T. ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States’ (1995-1996) 59 Alb. L. Rev. 905, 915ff; 
Kirry, Antoine, ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe’ (1996) 12(4) Arbitration International 373-390. 
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in general, and arbitrability specifically are explored. Then there is an 
examination of the scope of non-arbitrable matters on the continent. The fourth 
section discusses some of the key issues which emerge from the material on 
arbitrability from Africa, how they compare with the trends in Europe and the 
persisting role of public policy. The final section pulls together conclusions from 
the discussions. 
II. ARBITRABILITY 
 
A dispute is arbitrable if it is ‘capable of settlement by arbitration’.5 This 
definition implies that there are disputes which are incapable of resolution by 
arbitration. Disputes may be non-arbitrable for different reasons. States 
wielding power to determine how disputes arising from transactions in their 
jurisdictions are resolved may exclude certain matters from the private process 
of arbitration for reasons including public interest, public policy and the need for 
judicial protection.6 In such instances, a dispute may be arbitrable or non-
arbitrable simply on the basis of the subject-matter involved.7 Traditionally, this 
is the sense in which the concept of arbitrability has been used.8  
 
Viewed broadly, this is not the only reason why a specific dispute involving 
specific individuals and entities may not be capable of resolution by arbitration. 
As a consensual process, arbitration can be utilised as a dispute resolution 
process only if parties expressly or by implication9 consent to use the process.10 
Where there is no evidence of an agreement, disputes may be incapable of 
settlement by arbitration – it has been argued that such disputes will be non-
arbitrable.11 Similarly, disputes outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate 
are non-arbitrable, in principle, not as a result of a statutory injunction but 
                                                            
5 See the New York Convention (n2), Articles II (1) and V (2) (a); the UNCITRAL Model Law (n2) Articles 34(2)(b) and 
36(1)(b)(i) 
6 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International 2012)82 
7 Carbonneau, T.E. ‘Liberal Rules of Arbitrability and the Autonomy of Labor Arbitration in the United States’ in 
Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International 1999)para 8-1. 
8 See Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp1) s 30 (where arbitrability is defined with a clear focus on subject-matter); 
Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international 
arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.111; Mante, J and Ndekugri, I. ‘Arbitrability in the context of Ghana’s new 
Arbitration Law’ [2012] 2 Int ALR 31,32. 
9 Instances where consent is implied. See e.g. Stellar Shipping Co LLC v Hudson Shipping Lines [2010] EWHC 
2985;[2012] 1 C.L.C. 476 where a guarantor of an agreement containing an arbitration clause was held to be bound 
by the clause even though it was not party to the original agreement and so had not expressly consented to the 
arbitration clause therein. See also Park, William W. Non-signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator's 
Dilemma (OUP 2009) 
10 An exception here will be statutory arbitrations. 
11 See American case of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon Indus. Inc. 138 F.3d 426 at 429 (1st Cir. 1998) 
cited in Rau, Alan Scott ‘The Arbitrability Question Itself’ (1999)10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 287, 355 (where the judge 
argued that absence of arbitration agreement raises a fundamental question of arbitrability). See also Blackaby, 
Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration (5th 
edn, OUP 2009) para 2.111; Rau, Alan Scott. ‘Arbitral jurisdiction and the dimensions of “consent”.’ (2008) 24(2) 
Arbitration International 199-264. See also William Park, ‘The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort 
of Kompetenz–Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?’ (1996) 12 Arbitration International 137. 
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because the parties’ consent or agreement to arbitrate does not extend to such 
disputes.12 Further, Böckstiegel has argued that the concept of arbitrability 
should be view broadly beyond an objective criterion which focuses on subject-
matter; there is a place for a subjective criterion which focuses on the capacity 
of parties to an arbitration agreement.13 In his view, lack of requisite legal 
capacity, though not traditionally considered a matter for arbitrability, will 
eventually make certain disputes incapable of settlement by arbitration even in 
the context of international arbitration.14  
 
The import of the foregoing is that the concept of arbitrability has different 
dimensions and may arise in different circumstances in the context of 
arbitration. The question whether a dispute is capable of settlement by 
arbitration can thus, be answered by looking at four different aspects of the 
arbitration process namely the subject matter of the arbitration, the existence 
or otherwise of an arbitration agreement, the scope of the agreement and the 
capacity of the parties. This study focuses mainly on arbitrability in the 
traditional sense, that is, as it relates to the subject-matter of arbitration - this is 
the sense in which the term is used in the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Even so, in the African context, it appears that the laws 
which define arbitrability and non-arbitrability often embrace both the objective 
and subjective dimensions of the concept. Consequently, some reference in 
this work to the subjective dimension of arbitrability in the African context is 
inevitable. 
 
(a) Arbitrability in the context of Arbitration 
 
Arbitrability, as a concept, raises a number of questions on the process of 
arbitration. Which law governs the question of arbitrability? In what 
circumstances can the question of arbitrability be raised? Who determines the 
question of arbitrability? What are the possible consequences of non-
arbitrability on the arbitration process and its outcome? These questions are 
briefly examined in succession. In both domestic and international arbitration, 
states have the prerogative to determine what subject matters are capable of 
settlement by arbitration within their respective jurisdictions. This position is 
supported by provisions from two key instruments on international commercial 
arbitration namely the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (NYC) and the UNCITRAL Model law on 
international Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006) (the Model 
Law).15 As the determination of what is arbitrable remains a matter for individual 
                                                            
12 Rau, Alan Scott ‘The Arbitrability Question Itself’ (1999)10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 287. 
13 Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz ‘Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement.’ (2008) 2 Disp. Resol. Int'l 
123,126-128 
14 Ibid.  
15 See the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Article V (2) (a) and  
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006), Articles1(5) and 34 
(2) (b) (i). 
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states, different approaches, often influenced by public policy considerations,16 
have been adopted by states.17 This also means a subject matter arbitrable in 
one jurisdiction may not be arbitrable in another. The effect is that there is likely 
to be confusion as to the arbitrability of a matter in the context of international 
arbitration.18 Consequently, parties to arbitration are free to contest the 
arbitrability or otherwise of a pending claim.  
 
In the context of international arbitration, the governing law for arbitrability will 
depend on a number of factors including the time it is raised. If raised in the 
course of the arbitration proceedings as a jurisdictional challenge or in defence 
to a claim, there are several possible sources of law which may apply. These 
include the law governing the arbitration agreement or the law of the seat of the 
arbitration.19 When the issue of arbitrability is raised at the stage of recognition 
and enforcement, Article V (2) (a) of the New York Convention20 implies that 
the law of the forum of enforcement shall apply.21 However, the question is not 
as simple as it appears. A tribunal dealing with the question of arbitrability even 
in the course of the arbitration cannot overlook and thus, may take into account 
the law of the place of enforcement for practical reasons.22  
 
A question of arbitrability may be determined either by an arbitral tribunal or a 
designated national court.23 It is widely accepted both domestically and 
internationally that the tribunal has power to determine its own jurisdiction under 
the competence-competence principle.24  Alternatively, there are, at least, three 
instances where a national court may be called upon to determine the question 
of arbitrability: firstly, where there is a repeat application by a party who 
disagrees with a first instance ruling by an arbitral tribunal on the question of 
arbitrability;25 secondly, where the relevant national legislation provides 
alternative means of dealing with jurisdictional issues directly through the court 
                                                            
16 McLaughlin (n4)915-916 
17 Schwartz, E. A. ‘The Domain of Arbitration and Issues of Arbitrability: The View from the ICC’ (1994)9(1) ICSID 
Review 17ff 
18 Vincent, Jennifer, ‘Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave: The Implications of Conflicting Domestic Policy on 
Arbitrability and Award Enforcement’ (2015) 38 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 141 
19 In French Consultant v. Egyptian Local Authority (ICC Case No.6162) (1992) XVII Yearbook Comm. Arb 153 it was 
held that the law of the seat of the arbitration (the law of Switzerland) applied to the question of arbitrability even 
though Egyptian law was the applicable law by agreement. 
20 See also the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 36. 
21 See Company M v. M.S.A., No.6 Cour d’appel, Brussels, 4 October, 1985 reported in XIV Yearbook Comm. Arb. 
(1989) 619 
22 See Carbonneau T, Shattering the barrier of Inarbitrability (2011) 22 American Review of International Arbitration 
Law 573 at 596 (the author argues that the tribunal in a given situation may be confronted with a choice amongst 
different variations of competing laws).   
23 Matters of recognition and enforcement are within the jurisdiction of national courts –see the New York Convention, 
Article V.  
24 See the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 16; English Arbitration Act 1996, s. 30; the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act 2010 (Act 798) of Ghana, s.24; Scottish Arbitration Rules, Rule 19.  
25 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 16(3). 
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as is the case under section 32 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996; and finally, 
when the question of arbitrability is raised as a defence to the enforcement of 
an award under the New York Convention. 
 
III. ARBITRABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: TRENDS IN EUROPE AND 
AMERICA 
 
The concept of public policy is notoriously difficult to define due to its vague 
confines and characteristic lack of uncertainty.26 Nevertheless, it has played a 
major role in both domestic and international legal discourse on arbitration.27 
An ‘unruly horse’28 it may be but its influence lives on. An interim report by the 
Committee on International Arbitration of the International Law Association 
(ILA) dated 2000 on the role of public policy in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards examined a number of possible definitions and explanations of 
the concept.29 It also explored current strands and ramifications of the concept 
for international arbitration.30 At its core, public policy is about ‘basic norms of 
morality and justice’31 of a state the violation of which ‘would be clearly injurious 
to the public good or, possibly …would be wholly offensive to the ordinary 
reasonable and fully informed member[s] of the public on whose behalf the 
powers of the State are exercised’.32 In the context of international arbitration, 
there are different notions of the concept.33 
                                                            
26 In Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 4 HLC 1, Parke B observed in relation to public policy as follows: ‘Public policy is a 
vague and unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied to the decision of legal 
rights; it is capable of being understood in different senses; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean ‘political 
expedience,’ or that which is best for the common good of the community; and in that sense there may be every 
variety of opinion, according to education, habits, talents, and dispositions of each person, who is to decide whether 
an act is against public policy or not…’ 
27 See Pieter Sanders (Ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (ICCA Congress Series, 
1986 New York, Kluwer Law International 1987) vol 3, 177-366 (the entire work of the Working Group 2 was devoted 
to public policy in Arbitration); Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & 
Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 1999). See also ILA, ‘Interim Report on Public Policy as a bar to 
the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (International Law Association Conference, London,2000); 
<http://www.newyorkconvention.org/publications/full-text-publications/general/ila-interim-report-public-policy-2000 > 
accessed 1 August 2015. 
28 Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 at 252 per Burrough J. 
29 See e.g.  The German Bundesgerichtshof 12 July 1990 - III ZR 174/89, NJW 1990 at  3210: ‘A violation of essential 
principles of German law (ordre public) exists only if the arbitral award contravenes a rule which is basic to public or 
commercial life, or if it contradicts the German idea of justice in a fundamental way. A mere violation of the 
substantive or procedural law applied by the arbitral tribunal is not sufficient to constitute such violation’; Cheshire 
and North, Private International Law (13th edn., Butterworths 1999), 123 : ‘… some moral, social or economic 
principle so sacrosanct ... as to require its maintenance at all costs and without exception’; and Lew, Applicable Law 
in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana 1978), 532: ‘…the fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, 
religious and social standards of every State or extra-national community… those principles and standards which are 
so sacrosanct as to require their maintenance at all costs and without exception’.  
30 See ILA Report on Public Policy (n27).  
31 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. -v- Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier RAKTA and Bank of 
America 508 F. 2d 969 (2nd Cir., 1974) per Judge Smith 
32 Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellscaft mbh -v- Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Company[1987] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 246 at 254 per Donaldson MR 
33 Public policy in the context of municipal law, public policy under private international law (also called international 
public policy) and trans-national public policy. For more details on these strands of the concept,  see Lalive, P. 
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Studies in America34 and Europe35 on current trends on arbitrability reveal that 
there is a shift in attitudes on, firstly, the scope of disputes that are arbitrable 
and secondly, the extent to which public policy remains a bar. Across Europe 
and America, certain disputes are regarded as generally non-arbitrable. These 
include criminal matters and status-related cases involving individuals or 
corporate entities.36 Disputes relating to fraud allegations,37 bribery38 and 
competition39 (obviously issues of public interest) have in recent times 
encountered questions on arbitrability.40 These types of disputes and others 
relating to patents, family law, employment and insolvency previously regarded 
as non-arbitrable are increasingly becoming arbitrable. In the United States, 
there is a strong presumption in favour of arbitrability41 rebuttable only by a 
clear congressional intent against submitting particular disputes to arbitration;42 
and the presumption is even stronger with disputes arising out of international 
commerce.43 The English courts have also endorsed presumption of 
arbitrability. In Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and Others v. Privalov and 
Others,44 the English Supreme Court (per Lord Hoffmann) observed as follows: 
 
In my opinion the construction of an arbitration clause should start from 
the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to 
                                                            
‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’ in Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (ICCA Congress Series, 1986 New York, Kluwer Law International 
1987) vol 3, 258-318 
34 McLaughlin (n4); Vincent, Jennifer, ‘Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave: The Implications of Conflicting Domestic 
Policy on Arbitrability and Award Enforcement’ (2015) 38 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 141-168. 
35 See Kirry, Antoine ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe’ (1996) 12(4) Arbitration International 373-390; Baron, 
P.M. and Liniger, S. ‘A Second Look at Arbitrability: Approaches to arbitration in the United States, Switzerland and 
Germany’ (2003) 19(1) Arbitration International 27ff 
36 E.g. the French Civil Code, Article 2060. 
37  See the decision in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov Also known as: Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili 
Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719,1725ff  
38  See Honeywell International Middle East Limited v Meydan Group LLC [2014] 2 Lloyds Rep.133 (it was held that 
an allegation that an agreement was procured by bribery, even when proved, will not lead to the setting aside of an 
order for the enforcement of a foreign award, though contrary to English public policy because contract procured by 
bribes were not unenforceable under English law. See also Parish, M. (2010) ‘The proper law of an arbitration 
agreement’ (2010) 76(4) Arbitration 661-679. 
39 In Eco-Swiss China Time Limited v. Benetton International NV (Case C-126/97) 1999 ECR1ff, an award which was 
in violation of European Union competition law (Article 81 EC) was annulled on the basis that the law constituted a 
fundamental provision essential to the working of the Community, especially, the functioning of the internal market. 
40 Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international 
arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.117-2.143. 
41 Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corporation 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983); McLaughlin (n5) 906-
907 
42 Vincent (n34)143 
43 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 S Ct (1985)(the US Supreme Court held 
that a dispute is arbitrable even though the transaction concerned raised issues concerning violation of an American 
Statute on antitrust ; McLaughlin (n4) 906-907 
44 [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719 
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have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they 
have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal. 
The clause should be construed in accordance with this presumption 
unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended 
to be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.45 
There are instances where courts have held in some European jurisdictions that 
particular types of dispute are not arbitrable46 but generally, the scope of 
arbitrable matters has widened considerably, partly as a result of the gradual 
chipping away of the influence of public policy on what may be submitted to 
arbitration.47  
 
Historically, public policy has been a key consideration in the determination of 
arbitrability.48 In America and Europe, the last three decades have witnessed a 
remarkable reversal of this trend through judicial pronouncements on 
arbitrability of public policy issues.49 The traditional position precluding 
arbitrators from dealing with public policy disputes has now given way to a view 
that the application of public policy rules should not be the sole preserve of 
judges, arbitrators can do the same. Nevertheless, even with countries in 
Europe where it is thought that the role of public policy in the determination of 
arbitrability is waning, it can be argued that public policy considerations still 
underpin either overtly or covertly some provisions on non-arbitrability.50  
 
IV. TRENDS IN AFRICA 
 
                                                            
45 ibid. 1725, para 13 
46 In relation to  disputes involving rights which the parties are not free to dispose- see Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali 
Italiani v. Ministry of Defense 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb'n 594 (1994). See also Eco-Swiss China Time Limited (n41); 
Manfredi, Cannito, Tricorico & Murgolo v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Fondiaria Sai SpA & Assitalia SpA C-
295-98/04 [2006] E.C.R. 1, 31 (where it was held that compliance and application of Article 81 and 82 of EC law on 
competition was a matter of public policy; UAB Kauno vandenys v WTE Wassertechnik GmbH (3K-7-304/2011) 
(where the Supreme Court of Lithuania held that disputes arising out of public procurement contracts are not 
arbitrable - for more on this case, see Daujotas, Rimantas and Audzevičius, Ramūnas, ‘Arbitrability of Disputes 
Arising from Public Procurement Contracts – Lithuanian Example’ (2012) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2086349>Accessed 12 August 2015 
 
47 See Stavros L Brekoulakis, ‘On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and new areas of Concern’ in Loukas A 
Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 19-44.  
48  For example, the Arbitration Act 2005 (Malaysia), s4 (1) (‘any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to 
arbitration under an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is 
contrary to public policy’); the International Arbitration Act 1996 (Singapore), Article 11; the French Civil Code 2060. 
See also McLaughlin (n4)915-916; Böckstiegel, K-H. (n13); P.M. Baron & S. Liniger, ‘A Second Look at Arbitrability; 
Approaches to Arbitration in the United States, Switzerland and Germany’ (2003) 19(1) Arbitration International 27ff  
cf Stavros L Brekoulakis (n49) who argues that public policy has no role in the determination of arbitrability. 
49 Examples from the United States: Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation 460 US 1, 
24-25 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc.  473 U.S. 614 S Ct (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.  417 US 515 – 521. From the UK: Fiona Trust (n44); Honeywell International Middle East Limited (n38). 
See also Brekoulakis, S. ‘On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern in Mistelis, L. A. and 
Brekoulakis, S. L. (eds.) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 
2009)19,20.  
50 See the French Civil Code, 1804, Article 2060; the Code of Civil Procedure of the Netherlands, 1986, Article 
1020(3); the Italian Civil Procedure Code, 1990 (as amended in 2006), article 806, etc. 
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Developments on arbitrability and non-arbitrability in Africa can be gleaned 
mainly from national legislations, the limited case law on the subject and legal 
writings. In this study, the arbitration laws of thirty-six countries in Africa were 
explored for information on the varied legislative approaches towards regulating 
the issue of arbitrability, subject matters which are arbitrable or non-arbitrable, 
and the extent to which public policy still remains an important consideration. 
Where relevant judicial authority exists, this is discussed together with the 
relevant legislative provision. 
 
(a) Approaches to Arbitrability 
 
Growing influence of international arbitration as a means of resolving 
international commercial and investment disputes has made it imperative for 
African legislatures to take note. Current legislations across the continent reflect 
common acceptance of arbitration as a means of resolving both domestic and 
international disputes. Some judicial decisions from the continent confirm this 
position on arbitration.51 There is a strong indication from a number of recent 
judicial pronouncements on arbitration, party autonomy and the right of the 
courts to interfere in the arbitration process in South Africa that generally, the 
courts will look favourably at arbitration and arbitral awards whether domestic 
or foreign.52 In Karen Maritime Limited v. Omar International, Inc.,53 the Liberian 
Supreme Court opined that public policy of the country favours arbitration.  
 
Asante54 has observed that the acceptance of international arbitration has been 
mainly driven by a desire to attract investment and trade. He argues that, 
 
…most developing countries involved in negotiating international 
business transactions recognise the virtual inevitability of international 
commercial arbitration. Indeed, the acceptance of international 
arbitration has become an invariable ingredient of the liberalization 
package which developing countries provide as a sine qua non of their 
strategies to attract foreign investment, technology, international finance 
and foreign trade.55 
 
                                                            
51 See the Liberian  Supreme Court cases of Emirates Trading Agency Company v. Global Africa Import & Export 
Company [2004] LRSC 18; Chicri Brothers v. Isuzu Motors Overseas Distribution Corporation [2000] LRSC 13 and 
the South African case of Telcordia Technologies Inc. v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA) para 4.   
52 Telcordia Technologies Inc. v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA) para 4; Lufuno Mphaphuli and Associates 
(Pty) Ltd v Andrews & another 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) and Zhongji Construction v Kamoto Copper Company (421/13) 
[2014] ZASCA 160. In Telcordia Technologies Inc. v Telkom SA Ltd52, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
observed that giving due deference to arbitral awards is a long standing practice of the courts dating back to the early 
nineteenth century. 
53 [2004] LRSC 19 
54 Asante, S.K.B. ‘Some Key Issues in Negotiating International Joint Ventures’ (1998) 1(1) Banking and Financial 
Law Journal of Ghana 52 
55 Asante, S.K.B. ‘Some Key Issues in Negotiating International Joint Ventures’ (1998) 1(1) Banking and Financial 
Law Journal of Ghana 52-71. 
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Notwithstanding the common acceptance of arbitration as a means of resolving 
disputes, arbitration laws on the continent reveal deep theoretical divisions in 
the approaches to regulation of international arbitration. There is a view that all 
arbitrations are, in a sense, national in character and governed principally by 
the procedural rules of the seat of the arbitration.56  In that sense, there appears 
to be no justification for making one set of rules for domestic arbitration and 
another for international arbitration. Principles deemed beneficial to 
international arbitration must be equally beneficial to domestic arbitrations. A 
typical example of arbitration laws which reflect this view is the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act 2010 of Ghana.57 Another view argues that international 
arbitration is distinct from domestic arbitration and thus requires separate 
rules.58 There is a recognition that the validity and effectiveness of international 
arbitration does not depend solely on domestic laws of a single jurisdiction.59 
Having separate provisions on international arbitration based on well-known 
and widely accepted principles such as those under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
gives assurance of validity and effectiveness of an award and also inspires 
confidence in foreign parties.60 Majority of modern arbitration laws in Africa tend 
to take the middle ground for reasons including the need for investment and 
trade61 and recognition of the peculiarities of international arbitration. 
Consequently, they tend to have separate provisions on domestic and 
international arbitration (all in a single legal document) with varying differences 
in the extent of regulation. 
 
The differences in approach to regulation of arbitration are also mirrored in how 
the question of arbitrability is addressed. Asouzu62 identified three different 
approaches to arbitrability in the African context. The first approach entails 
omitting any reference to the word ‘commercial’ as a means of limiting subject 
matters that are arbitrable.63 Instead, customised criteria are provided which 
                                                            
56 See the ‘mono-localisation’ theory of arbitration canvassed by F.A. Mann, ‘"Lex Facit Arbitrum," in International 
Arbitration’ (1986) 2 Arb. Int' 241 and captured succinctly in Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Three Philosophies of International 
Arbitration’ in Arthur Rovine (ed) Contemporary issues in international arbitration and mediation(The Fordham 
Papers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010)305,308.  
57 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (Ghana) applies to both domestic and international arbitration but 
refrains from any indication of a distinction between principles applicable to each type of arbitration. See also Liberia 
Commercial Code Title Ch. 7 (2010)  
58 The view here is closer to that of proponents of the trans-national theory of arbitration – see Emmanuel Gaillard, 
‘Three Philosophies of International Arbitration’ in Arthur Rovine (ed) Contemporary issues in international arbitration 
and mediation(The Fordham Papers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010)305,308. 
59 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Three Philosophies of International Arbitration’ in Arthur Rovine (ed) Contemporary issues in 
international arbitration and mediation(The Fordham Papers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010)305,308 
60  The International Arbitration Act 2008 Act No. 37 of 2008 (Mauritius) is a typical example of arbitration law 
reflecting this view. 
61 See Asante (n55) 
62 Asouzu, A.A. International commercial arbitration and African states: practice, participation, and institutional 
development (Cambridge University Press 2001)140-176. 
63 cf UNCITRAL Model Law (n2) Article 1(1) where it is stated that the law applies to international commercial 
arbitration. An indication of the scope of the word ‘commercial’ is provided in the footnote to the article. 
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cover a wider scope.64 The second approach involves providing a specific and 
comprehensive definition of arbitrable subject matters based on the indicative 
scope of the word ‘commercial’ given under the UNCITRAL Model Law.65 For 
example, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1988 (CAP 19) of Nigeria aim to 
‘provide a unified legal framework for fair and efficient settlement of commercial 
disputes by arbitration and conciliation…’66 Section 57 of the Act then defines 
what kinds of transactions are ‘commercial’ in nature.67 The third approach to 
arbitrability canvassed by Asouzu entails providing general definitions of 
subject matters that are arbitrable without any limitations. 
 
The distinctiveness of the various approaches to arbitrability runs deeper than 
merely sticking to the scope provided under the UNCITRAL Model law or having 
a customised scope; it has theoretical connotations. Generally, arbitration laws 
with stronger emphasis on international arbitration take a liberal view of 
arbitrability and have limited or hardly any express provisions on non-
arbitrability.68 This is because international arbitration is often limited to subject 
matters that are commercial in character which are largely arbitrable across the 
African continent even at the domestic level. The International Arbitration Act 
200869 of Mauritius is an example of standalone legislations on international 
arbitration with a liberal position on arbitrability.70 The Act provides virtually no 
limits on arbitrable disputes. It states that where jurisdiction is conferred on a 
court concerning a matter, it does not necessarily imply that such a matter is 
incapable of settlement by arbitration. In effect, matters over which the courts 
have jurisdiction can equally be the subject matter of arbitration, unless 
expressly exempted.  
 
Though the OHADA71 Uniform Act, 1999 has a domestic application, it is 
essentially international in character. It has a strong international focus and 
applies common rules to all arbitrations which have their seats in any of the 
                                                            
64 Examples of this approach can be found in Law No. 27/1994 of Egypt and the Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No. 
93-42 of 26 April 1993) 
65 See footnote to the UNCITRAL Model law, Article 1(1)  
66 Emphasis added. See  the long title of the Act 
67 S.57 of the Act define the word ‘commercial’ as ‘all relationships of a commercial nature including any trade 
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services, distribution agreement, commercial representation or 
agency, factoring, leasing, construction of works, constructing, engineering licensing, investment, financing, banking, 
insurance, exploitation, agreement or concession, joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation, 
carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail, or road’  
68 The 1997 Draft International Arbitration Law of South Africa is an exception here. Under the proposed section 6, 
matters relating to status and arbitration agreements contrary to public policy were to be non-arbitrable. 
69 Act No.37 
70 The long title of the Act states that it is ‘[a]n Act to promote the use of Mauritius as a jurisdiction of choice in the 
field of international arbitration, to lay down the rules applicable to such arbitrations and to provide for related 
matters’. S 3(1)(c) (i) states that its provisions apply solely to international arbitration with a minor exception 
71 The organisation for the Harmonisation of Business laws in Africa. 
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sixteen signatory countries.72 It has as its goal harmonisation of arbitration laws 
in member states and therefore abhors any act which can potentially stifle this 
effort. Under the Uniform Act, states and public entities are permitted to 
arbitrate their disputes and are barred from invoking ‘their own law to contest 
the arbitrability of the claim, their authority to sign arbitration agreements or the 
validity of the arbitration agreement’.73 With the strong international focus, it is 
not a surprise that the OHADA Uniform Act has little or no tolerance for national 
laws on arbitrability.  
 
Similarly, arbitration laws which are less emphatic on separate rules for 
international arbitration have more elaborated provisions on non-arbitrability.74 
Arbitration laws with distinct provisions on domestic and international arbitration 
tend to provide for arbitrability, non-arbitrability or both.75 It is instructive that for 
most of these laws, arbitrability and non-arbitrability are covered under 
provisions applicable mainly to domestic arbitration.76 In some other instances, 
the non-arbitrability provisions are part of the common clauses applicable to 
both domestic and international arbitration.77  
(b)  Non-Arbitrable disputes 
 
Across the continent, there are many disputes which are non-arbitrable. These 
can be categorised into, at least, four groups namely disputes on status and 
capacity-related issues, disputes relating to protected persons and institutions 
such as the family, disputes affecting subject matters which relate to the state 
or public interest and disputes falling into the category herein referred to as 
‘generic exemptions’. Two categories of disputes come under the first group of 
non-arbitrable matters namely status-related disputes (that is, disputes about 
the legal personality of a person, natural or artificial)78 and capacity-related 
disputes (that is, disputes about a person’s capacity to acquire rights and 
obligations). In many African countries, disputes relating to status and capacity 
                                                            
72 List of signatories: Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Cameroun, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Chad, Central African Republic, Benin and Comoros. 
73 See the OHADA Uniform Act 1999, Art 2. 
74 See e.g. the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (Ghana); Liberia Commercial Code Title Ch. 7 (2010), Article 
7. 
75 Law No. 27/1994 Promulgating the Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters(Egypt), Articles 
1,2,11; Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and Mediation Agreements (Morocco), Articles 308-310; Law No 11/99 
of 8 July,1999 (Mozambique), Articles 5 – 6.    
76 ibid. 
77 Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993), Article 7; Arbitration Act No.19 of 2000 (Zambia),s.6; 
Arbitration Act  (Chapter 7:15; Act 6 of 1996) (Zimbabwe),s4  
78 Disputes relating to whether a person is a minor, married, unmarried, divorced, non compos mentis or a citizen of a 
country fall under the first category. 
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are generally exempted from the scope of arbitration.79 For instance, under the 
Tunisian Arbitration Code80 disputes relating to nationality and personal status 
are not arbitrable. Similarly, disputes concerning status are not arbitrable under 
the South African Arbitration Act.81 In the South African case of Grobbelaar v. 
De Villiers82 it was held that the question as to whether some corporate entity 
has acted ultra vires its constitution is a matter relating to status. The position 
of the court in the preceding case has been streamlined in a relatively recent 
case83 by another South African court looking at a similar issue within the 
context of section 2 of the South African Arbitration Act. It held that matters 
relating to status under the Act cover the existence and nature of a juristic 
person and the question whether it has the capacity to acquire rights and incur 
obligations. Disputes relating to these issues are generally not arbitrable under 
South African law. Article 309 of the Arbitration law of Morocco84 provides that, 
‘disputes relating to status of a person, their capacity or personal rights that 
cannot be a subject matter of commerce’85 are non-arbitrable. As with the 
situation in South Africa, both disputes on whether a person has a requisite 
legal personality and those relating to capacity to acquire rights and obligations 
are non-arbitrable in Morocco.86 Similarly, Article 3326 (1) of the Ethiopian Civil 
Code provides that ‘the capacity to dispose of a right without consideration shall 
be required for the submission to arbitration of a dispute concerning such 
right’.87 The question remains as to what happens when an arbitrator 
encounters a question on status in the course of the arbitration process. It 
appears that in such a case, the tribunal may be obliged to refer such an issue 
to the appropriate court for determination. 
                                                            
79 See e.g. the Arbitration Act, Chapter 6.01, 1959 of Botswana, s.7; Law No.05/08 of Morocco Relating to Arbitration 
and Mediation Agreements, Article 309; South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965,s.2; Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law 
No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993), Article 7; Arbitration Act of Zambia [No.19 of 2000], s.6(2)(g); and Law No 11/99 of 
Mozambique, Article 6(2) 
80 Law No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 
81 No.42 of 1965 
82 1984 (2) SA 649 (C) 
83 Berg en Dal Estate (Incorporating Mountaindale Estate) Homeowners Association v Van Huyssteen No and 
Others, Berg en Dal Estate (Incorporating Mountaindale Estate) Homeowners Association v Brunt and Another 
(5418/05,787/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 12 (20 February 2009) 
84 Law No.05/08 
85 Emphasis added. 
86 A question arises here as to what happens when an issue of capacity is raised in the course of arbitration. The 
rationale for precluding an arbitral tribunal from determining a question of capacity in the context of a commercial 
matter is unclear in the absence of a judicial interpretation.  
87 See also the Law No. 27/1994 of Egypt (, supra, Article 11; the International Arbitration Code of Djibouti, 1984, 
Article 2(2); and the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration, 1999, Article 2. 
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The second category of disputes incapable of settlement by arbitration includes 
those involving protected persons88 and the family as an institution. Section 7 
of the Arbitration Act of Botswana, 1959 exempt matrimonial causes89 and 
matters in which persons with legal incapacity may be interested from the scope 
of subject matters that are arbitrable. Section 6(2) of the Zambian Arbitration 
Act, 2000 also exempt from arbitration subject matters incidental to a 
matrimonial cause,90 the determination of paternity, maternity or parentage and 
matters affecting the interest of a minor or a person under legal incapacity.91  
 
It is worth noting that not all arbitration laws in Africa exempt matrimonial issues 
from settlement by arbitration. For example, under the Ethiopian Civil Code,92 
conflicts in cases relating to marriages, divorces and irregular unions are 
arbitrable. Further, some statutes do not provide a blanket exemption of matters 
involving the interests of minors or persons with limited or no legal capacity from 
arbitration. For instance, under the Zambia Arbitration Act, a matter affecting 
the interest of a person under some legal incapacity will be arbitrable if the 
person is represented by a competent person.93 Similarly, the Zimbabwe 
Arbitration Act permits such matters to be settled by arbitration with leave of the 
High court.94 Again, there are generally no blanket exemptions on consumer, 
bankruptcy and related commercial transactions. Section 38 of the Kenyan 
Arbitration Act, 1995 is deliberately designed to ensure that where necessary, 
bankruptcy proceedings could be settled by arbitration.95 Section 8 of the 
International Arbitration Act of Mauritius places some additional requirements 
on parties to consumer arbitrations thereby making the arbitrability of such 
matters contingent on compliance with such requirement.96 These ‘partial’ 
exemptions are indications that these exempted matters could be arbitrable 
when certain public interest concerns are properly addressed. In this sense, 
these African arbitration statutes are as liberal as the prevailing practice in 
Europe and America on similar subject matters. 
 
The third category of non-arbitrable matters relate to the State and public 
interests matters. Examples of these subject matters could be found under 
                                                            
88 such as minors, persons with legal disabilities generally and consumers 
89  See also the Namibian Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, s.2 and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act, 1996, s.4.  cf The 
Ethiopian Civil Code, Title XX Chapter 2, Article 722ff which states that conflicts in cases relating to marriages, 
divorces and irregular unions are arbitrable. 
90 Save where there is a leave of court to refer such matters to arbitration 
91  Unless the minor or the person with legal incapacity is represented by a competent person - See section 6(2) (g)  
92 Title XX Chapter 2, Article 722ff 
93 The Zambia Arbitration Act, 2000, s6 (2) (g). 
94 The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act,1996,s.4(2)(e) 
95 See also the Arbitration Act of Malawi,1967, s.5 
96 See the International Arbitration Act (of Mauritius) No. 37 of 2008, s.8 (1) which provides as follows: Where a contract 
contains an arbitration agreement and a person enters into that contract as a consumer, the arbitration agreement shall 
be enforceable against the consumer only if the consumer, by separate written agreement entered into after the dispute 
has arisen, certifies that, having read and understood the arbitration agreement, he agrees to be bound by it.  
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various arbitration legislations in Africa. For instance, section 1 of the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010 (Act 798) of Ghana states that the Act 
applies to all matters except those that relate to ‘(a) the national or public 
interest; (b) the environment; (c) the enforcement and interpretation of the 
Constitution; or (d) any other matter that by law cannot be settled by an 
alternative dispute resolution method.’97 The Liberia Commercial Code contains 
similar provisions. It states that the chapter of the code on arbitration does not 
apply to matters ‘involving the determination of liability for the commission of a 
crime,98 a tort, environmental pollution or matters relating to the public interest 
or the Constitution’.99  
 
Compared to earlier categories of non-arbitrable subject matters in the African 
context, this category poses a greater challenge because it entails matters 
which are less specific in scope and have the greatest potential to influence 
commercial transactions. Further, disputes in this category tend to fall within 
the class of disputes which cannot be ‘compromised lawfully by way of accord 
and satisfaction’.100 Such disputes are generally not arbitrable in the African 
context. Two cases from Nigeria illustrate this fact. In Federal Inland Revenue 
Service v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation & 2 Ors.,101 an arbitral 
award was set aside on the ground that a dispute on interpretation and 
application of a number of tax and tax-related legislations102 was not arbitrable. 
Subsequently, the Court of Appeal had the opportunity to make a definite 
pronouncement on this principle in the case of Statoil (Nig) Ltd v. Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation103 but was less specific on the issue of 
arbitrability. In this case, one of the questions which the court had to address 
was whether disputes arising from the Petroleum Profit Tax Act and other tax 
legislations could be the subject matter of arbitration. Even as the court 
emphasised the importance of party autonomy and choice, it also observed that 
under the relevant laws of Nigeria, especially section 34 and 35 of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1988 (as amended) not every dispute can be 
the subject matter of arbitration agreement especially if such a move will violate 
the Constitution or a legislation.   
 
                                                            
97 For a discussion of the implications of this section, see Mante, J and Ndekugri, I. ‘Arbitrability in the context of 
Ghana’s new Arbitration Law’ [2012] 2 Int ALR 31 
98 See also the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act, 1996, s.4(2)(c); Botswana Arbitration Act,1959,s.7 clarifies the aspect of 
criminal matters that remain outwith the scope of arbitration by providing that, ‘criminal cases, so far as the 
prosecution or punishment thereof is concerned, shall not be submitted to arbitration.’    
99 Ch. 7 (2010),Article 7.2 (3) 
100 Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition, para 503 at p.256. Examples of such disputes include criminal offences, 
illegal contracts, agreements on gaming and wagering and status-related disputes. This position of the law on 
arbitrability was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Kano State Urban Development 
Board v. Fanz Construction Co (1990) 4NWLR (pt. 142)1 
101 Suit No. FHC/CS/774/2011 
102 Petroleum Profit Tax Act, the Deep Offshore Act, Education Tax Act and Company Income Tax Act (Nigeria) 
103 (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1373)  
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As states and public entities increasingly become involved in international 
economic transactions, the question remains as to the extent to which matters 
relating to public or national interest could remain outside the scope of 
arbitrable matters; this is especially so since states are themselves parties to 
transactions which incorporate arbitration as means of dispute resolution.104  
Drawing a line in such matters poses a difficulty. Can a dispute arising out of a 
transaction involving a state and a private entity over the refurbishment of a 
power barge at a time when a country is experiencing power crisis constitute a 
matter relating to public or national interest?105 Will such a matter be 
arbitrable?106 Then there is the issue of the scope of matters relating to 
constitutional interpretation and enforcement.107 If a dispute arises in the 
context of a commercial transaction as to whether there has been a breach of 
a constitutional provision,108 can such a dispute be resolved by arbitration, for 
instance, under the Ghana ADR Act?109 Assuming that an international arbitral 
tribunal makes an award in this matter; can the enforcement of the award in 
Ghana be challenged on the basis of non-arbitrability under Article V of the New 
York Convention?110  
 
Even more nebulous are the matters which come under the category called 
‘generic exemptions’. The challenge posed by this category is essentially a 
question of latitude. There are significant numbers of arbitration laws which 
employ generic phrases to classify arbitrability. The OHADA Uniform Act, like 
many other arbitration legislations deriving from the civil law tradition, provides 
that natural persons and corporate bodies can submit to arbitration disputes on 
rights of which they have free disposal.111 The Moroccan law on arbitration 
provides that persons of the requisite capacity can conclude arbitration 
agreements ‘pertaining to rights under their free disposal…’112 The Djibouti law 
                                                            
104 See Mante, J and Ndekugri, I. ‘Arbitrability in the context of Ghana’s New Arbitration Law’ [2012] 2 Int ALR 31,36-
37 
105 ibid 
106 This is a real story involving an African country and currently the subject matter of international arbitration. So the 
answer to this question is yes. 
107 This is examined in detail under the section on arbitrability and public policy in Africa below. 
108 E.g. where an agreement which is the subject matter of a dispute is alleged not to have complied with a 
constitutional requirement to obtain legislative approval – Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana requires 
that international business and economic transactions to which the government is a party should receive 
parliamentary approval. 
109 In the Ghanaian case of A-G v Balkan Energy (Ghana) Limited & Ors (the Balkan Energy Case) [2012] 2 SCGLR 
998 the Supreme Court declared an international transaction unconstitutional as it failed to comply with the 
requirements of Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. In the meantime, disputes arising under this 
international transaction are the subject-matter of international arbitration. It remains to be seen how the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement on the effect of the constitutional violation on the transaction will be treated by the arbitral 
tribunal.  
110 Ghana is a signatory to the New York Convention and has incorporated provisions of the Convention into its 
domestic law, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010. 
111 See the OHADA Uniform Act, 1999, Article 2.  
112 Emphasis added. See Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and Mediation Agreements, Article 308. 
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on international arbitration states that matters arising out of ‘juridical 
relationships as to which parties have the capacity to settle’ are arbitrable.113 
The difficulty with these phrases is that subject matters within their scope are 
not readily ascertainable. This is also the case for instances where generic 
phrases are used to indicate non-arbitrability. Article 11 of the arbitration law of 
Egypt, 1994 provides that arbitration is not permitted in matters ‘which cannot 
be subject to compromise’. Under Morocco’s arbitration law, a personal right 
that cannot be subject-matter of commerce is not arbitrable.114 Matters ‘that by 
special law shall be submitted exclusively to a judicial court…’ and ‘those that 
relate to inalienable or non-negotiable rights’ are non-arbitrable under the law 
of Mozambique.115  
 
(c) Arbitrability and Public policy in Africa 
 
Unlike the situation in Europe and America, public policy still remains a critical 
determinant of what is arbitrable in the African context. There are instances 
where public policy is expressly made a criterion for non-arbitrability. For 
instance, the arbitration laws of Tunisia,116 Zambia117 and Zimbabwe118 
stipulate that matters of public policy are not arbitrable.119 In Lufuno Mphaphuli 
& Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews and Another120, O’Regan ADCJ speaking for 
the majority on the South African Constitutional Court, observed as follows:  
…as with other contracts, should the arbitration agreement contain a 
provision that is contrary to public policy in the light of the values of the 
Constitution, the arbitration agreement will be null and void to that extent 
(and whether any valid provisions remain will depend on the question of 
severability).121 
 
Where no express reference is made to public policy, the rationale for 
exempting certain categories of disputes from arbitration still points to basic 
morality and justice. Given the importance of the family as a basic unit of society 
and the vulnerabilities of minors and persons with legal disabilities, it is 
understandable that matters relating to these categories are considered 
deserving of the protection of the law.  
 
                                                            
113 See the International Arbitration Code, 1984, Article 2(2); see also Law No. 27/1994 of Egypt, Article 11.  
114 Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and Mediation Agreements, Article 309 
115 Law No 11/99 of Mozambique, Article 5(2)(a)&(b) 
116 Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993),Article 7(1) 
117 Zambia’s Arbitration Act [No.19 of 2000], s.6 (2) (a) provides that an agreement which is contrary to public policy 
is not arbitrable. 
118 Zimbabwe’s Arbitration Act, 1996, s.4(2)(a) 
119 None of these laws defines public policy. 
120 [2009] ZACC 6 
121 ibid. para 220 
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Though difficult to define, principles which constitute public policy may fall into, 
at least, four different categories namely mandatory laws,122 fundamental 
principles of law, public order or good morals and national interest.123 For 
African countries with Constitutions, principles of law contained in these 
documents constitute the fundamental principles of law.124 A violation of such 
principles is considered inimical to the security and welfare of the state. 
Consequently, these principles take precedence over all other laws. In a ruling 
on a matter involving a violation of a provision of the current Constitution of 
Ghana in the course of an international commercial transaction, the Supreme 
Court of Ghana speaking through Date-Bah JSC observed as follows: 
 
Thus, if even statute law is void, if in conflict with the Constitution, a 
fortiori, contracts breaching the Constitution should not be enforced … 
This constitutional provision, in my view, is a peremptory norm that has 
to be heeded by this Court. To borrow from the language of public 
international law, it may be viewed as analogous to ius cogens whose 
enforcement cannot be impeded by the normal rules. This Court, to my 
mind, is thus entitled to refuse to award any damages for the breach of 
what was an unconstitutional contract, even though the appellant has 
been adjudged to be in breach of it.125 
 
Disputes entailing violation of most constitutional provisions will fall within the 
category of principles referred to as ‘fundamental principles of law’ and thus will 
come under the scope of public policy. In the Kenyan case of Christ for all 
Nations v Apollo Insurance Co Ltd,126  Rangera J. defined public policy in the 
context of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign award in Kenya as 
entailing any award which is ‘inconsistent with the constitution or other laws of 
Kenya, whether written or unwritten; or inimical to the national interest of Kenya; 
or contrary to justice and morality’.127 Fundamental issues relating to national 
interest, public order and good morals are generally considered sacrosanct and 
                                                            
122 These are laws which must be applied to both domestic and international transactions irrespective of  the 
governing law of the relevant transaction in view of their fundamental nature- see a more expansive definition in 
Mayer, ‘Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration’, (1986) 2 Arbitration International 274 at 275. See also 
Böckstiegel, supra, who argues that not all legal rules on arbitrability form part of the public policy of a state  
123 See the Interim Report of the International Law Association (Committee on International Commercial Arbitration) 
on Public policy, 2000, p. 15 Accessed on 01/08/15, available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/publications/full-
text-publications/general/ila-interim-report-public-policy-2000   
124 See the Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 1(2) where it is stated that the ‘ Constitution shall be the supreme law 
of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void’; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 which identifies the supremacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law as values upon which the country is founded - Article 2 states that law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid. The Constitution of Kenya,2010 which identifies general principles of international law 
as part of Kenyan law states as follows: ‘(4) Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this 
Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of this Constitution is 
invalid’. See also the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Article 1(1) & (3). 
125 Emphasis added. The Attorney-General v Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd. [2005-2006] SCGLR 271 at 298. 
126 [2002]2EA 366 
127 See Nyanchoka, Alfred Oseko, The scope of Arbitrability under Kenyan Law, Arbitration, 2013, 79(3), 273-278. 
See also the South African case of Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Anne Christine Hubbard and Another where it was held 
that an arbitral award founded on illegality violates the public policy of South Africa and thus will not be enforced. 
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will qualify as matters of public policy in the African context. On the issue of the 
application of public policy in the context of arbitration, there is evidence that 
the courts are careful to apply such principles sparingly and in clear cases, 
bearing in mind the uncertainty that frequent application of such principles could 
introduce to commercial transactions.128 Again, there is some indication that the 
courts may apply public policy restrictively in case of international awards.129 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION  
     
The position of African countries on arbitrability, to a large extent, reflects the 
divergent legal systems on the continent. The fifty-three unique legal systems 
on the continent have their roots in at least four distinct legal traditions namely, 
the common law, civil law, customary law and sharia law. These legal systems 
employ different legislative approaches in dealing with the question of 
arbitrability and non-arbitrability.130 Legal systems based on the civil law 
tradition tend to delineate the boundaries of disputes that are arbitrable 
generally by reference to rights which the parties have the capacity to 
dispose.131 In this regard, the approach to arbitrability adopted by these legal 
systems is similar to that of most countries in continental Europe.132 In the main, 
most commercial disputes are arbitrable in Africa as is the case in Europe and 
America. Further, it appears most questions on arbitrability are raised not at the 
initial stages of the process of arbitration but during a challenge of an award or 
the recognition and enforcement of same.  
 
Beyond these similarities, there are areas of divergence between Africa on one 
hand and Europe and America on the other. Three of these differences are 
briefly outlined. Firstly, current issues on arbitrability in Africa differ considerably 
from those in Europe and America. In Africa, questions of arbitrability may arise 
in relation to disputes concerning constitutional interpretation and enforcement, 
public or national interests, crime, environmental issues and public policy. In 
Europe and America, current issues on arbitrability relate to disputes 
concerning patents and trademarks, insolvency, antitrust and competition laws, 
fraud and bribery and corruption. For instance, the general position on a 
transaction (which is the subject matter of arbitration) alleged to have as its 
object fraud or bribery and corruption in Europe and America is that fraud will 
not deprive an arbitral tribunal of the power to determine such a dispute; such 
an allegation, if proved will have to be considered by the tribunal as part of its 
                                                            
128 See Botha, Now Griessel v Finanscredit (Ply) Ltd (3) SA (A) (1989) and Sasfin (Pty) Limited v Beukes (1989) SA 
1(A), 9A-B per Smalberger JA cited with approval in the context of Arbitration in Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Union of South Africa v . Veldspun (Pty) Limited [1993] ZASCA 158; 1994 (1) SA 162 (AD) 
129 Seton Co. v. Silveroak Industries Ltd (2) SA 215 (T) (2000). 
130 See Asouzu, A.A. International commercial arbitration and African states: practice, participation, and institutional 
development (Cambridge University Press 2001)140-176.  
131 See the OHADA Uniform Act, 1999, Article 2 and the Moroccan Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and 
Mediation Agreements, Article 308.  
132 France, the Netherlands, Italy etc. 
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award.133 It is submitted that this view is based, in part, on the belief that 
arbitrators are capable and have the requisite training and general sense of 
duty to apply the relevant law taking into account the public interest or policy 
dimension of a matter. This may not be the experience of many countries in 
Africa. For instance, in BJ Exports & Chemical Processing Co. v. Kaduna 
Refining and Petrochemical Co,134 the Nigerian Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision of the High Court revoking the authority of the arbitrator and the 
arbitration agreement on the basis of fraud.  
 
 Secondly, the developments on arbitrability in Europe and America have been 
largely driven by judicial interpretation which has favoured the presumption of 
arbitrability.135 The story in Africa is different. Whilst there is evidence of 
growing jurisprudence on the challenge of arbitral awards and the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign awards, there has been comparatively little by way 
of judicial decisions on arbitrability in relation to international arbitrations on the 
continent. This may be due to the marginal opportunities available to African 
courts to develop arbitration jurisprudence in this area.   
 
The erosion of the concept of arbitrability in Europe and America has also been 
on the basis of arguments exploring the real rationale of the concept of 
arbitrability. It has been argued that the question of arbitrability has to do with 
the natural limitations of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism of 
consensual character.136 Using arbitration to determine third party disputes or 
matters of public nature will be in conflict with the very nature of the process.137 
This rationale for arbitrability gives rise to the need for states to make decisions 
on what disputes can justifiably be settled by arbitration. In making such 
decisions, the question of the legitimacy of the process of arbitration and the 
role of the arbitrator also arises. Unlike judges who are formally appointed 
under law by the state to carry out judicial functions, arbitrators are appointed 
by private individuals or entities and are not bound by law to protect the public 
                                                            
133 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov Also known as: Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] 
UKHL 40; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719; On the United States, see Meadows Indemnity Co. v. Baccala & Shop Ins. 
Services, 760 F. Supp. 1036 (1991) where it was held that fraud is arbitrable. A similar decision was made in the 
French case of Cour d' Appeal de Paris, 29 March 1991, Ganz and Others v. Soc. Nationale des Chemins defer 
Tunisiens REY.ARB. 478 (1991). See also Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin 
Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.133 -2.141.  
134 October 31,2002 delivered by Mahmud Mohammed, Justice of the Court of Appeal, Court of Appeal, Kaduna 
Division, Nigeria (unreported).See Anusornsena, Veena, ‘Arbitrability and Public Policy in Regard to the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Arbitral Award in International Arbitration: the United States, Europe, Africa, Middle East and Asia’ 
(2012). Theses and Dissertations. Paper 33, 91 
135 See Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc.  473 U.S. 614 S Ct 3346 (1985) (U.S. Supreme Court, 2 July 1985); 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.  417 US 515 – 521; Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov  Also known as: Premium 
Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40.  
136 Brekoulakis, S. ‘On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern in Mistelis, L. A. and 
Brekoulakis, S. L. (eds.) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 
2009)19,20 
137 Youssef, K.Y. ‘The death of Inarbitrability’ in in Mistelis, L. A. and Brekoulakis, S. L. (eds.) Arbitrability: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2009)47 
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or the state against morally offensive and unjust actions or, indeed, consider 
policy implications of their decisions.  
 
These considerations (that is, the natural limitations of arbitration as a 
consensual process and the legitimacy and role of the arbitrator) are among the 
vital factors which may weigh on the mind of African law makers enacting laws 
on arbitrability. Within the context of strong perception of bias against African 
states involved in international arbitration138 and a misperception about the 
competence and roles of arbitrators, there is a good reason why arbitrators may 
not be accorded the same legitimacy that judges enjoy in Africa. Armfelt 
captured the rationale for this argument in the following terms: 
 
International arbitration converts disputes with significant legal, 
regulatory and policy dimensions into purely private contractual 
disagreements. Courts, whose duty it is to administer justice pursuant to 
law and policy, are replaced with private panels that often see their 
mission as merely to settle disagreements in accordance with ‘general’ 
legal principles and prevailing business practices that favour 
transnational corporations. This type of private justice inevitably ignores 
the legitimate regulatory interests of concerned states.139  
 
In this context, merely vouching for the neutrality of arbitrators or indeed 
asserting that the procedures meet the requirements of due process will not be 
sufficient. Consequently, arbitrability defined on the basis of public policy 
ultimately becomes a safeguard of national interests. African states are hesitant 
to entrust issues of public policy and national interest into the hands of 
arbitrators who may serve different interests. The concept of arbitrability 
provides these states with the opportunity to maintain control over important 
issues affecting their existence and welfare through recourse to their respective 
judiciaries. The implication of the foregoing argument is that the question of 
arbitrability has a contextual dimension and this is often ignored in the 
discussion on the relationship between public policy and the concept of 
arbitrability. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of arbitrability is an enigma. In one sense, it appears insignificant 
in view of the fact that commercial matters are generally arbitrable in many 
countries in the world.140 In another sense, this conclusion leads to the question 
as to why such an ‘insignificant’ concept still commands the attention of 
                                                            
138 Armfelt,Andrew,  Avoiding the Arbitration Trap, Financial Times (London), 27 October, 1992,p.20 cited in Asouzu 
(n64) 429 
139 ibid 
140 Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international 
arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.144. 
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scholars and engenders controversies both in academia141 and in practice. The 
significance of the concept of arbitrability has been immortalised by Article V 
(2) (a) of the New York Convention. Similarly, Article 34(2) (a) (i) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law has been widely incorporated into many arbitration laws 
across the globe implying that national courts determining applications for 
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards still have power to refuse 
enforcement on the basis that the subject matter of the arbitration is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration in the jurisdiction concerned. In effect, even if the 
concept of arbitrability does not succeed in stopping the hand of a tribunal from 
determining a matter, it may end up stifling the enforcement of its handiwork, 
the award. 
 
Given the significance of the concept of arbitrability, it is vital that business 
entities involved in international transactions do not erroneously generalize 
knowledge of what pertains in Europe and America across all jurisdictions and 
regions of the world. In Africa, a number of trends on arbitrability are discernible. 
Most commercial disputes are generally arbitrable and this observation 
generally aligns with practice in Europe and America. Beyond this, there are 
three significant differences in the areas of scope of subject matter, approaches 
to arbitrability regulation and the role of public policy. Firstly, subject-matters 
which are non-arbitrable in Africa are comparatively broader in scope and differ 
in terms of subject matters of interest.  Commercial disputes may be embroiled 
with public interest, constitutional interpretation, tort or other non-arbitrable 
issues, especially so when a state or a public body is a party to such a dispute. 
 
 Secondly, the approaches to regulating the question of arbitrability differ. 
Judicial activism which has transformed the arbitrability ‘landscape’ in Europe 
and America are generally absent or, at best, still emerging in Africa. Two 
trends are observable from the legislative approaches adopted by African 
states. Generally, a distinction is maintained between domestic and 
international arbitration. Where there is legislative emphasis on international 
arbitration, issues of non-arbitrability are generally muted. Even so, there is 
clear indication that many African countries are unwilling to do away with rules 
on non-arbitrability in the context of domestic arbitration, and in some cases, 
even in the context of international arbitration. The rationale for this practice is 
linked to the third significant difference between practice in Africa on one hand 
and Europe and America on the other, namely the role of public policy in 
deciding what is non-arbitrable. Public policy is considered a vital safeguard for 
many African countries against perceived ‘biased arbitral tribunals’ who may 
have as their main objective the satisfaction of commercial interests. Thus, the 
determination of the question as to what is or is not arbitrable does not depend 
solely on the natural boundaries or limitations of arbitration but also a desire to 
safeguard national legal, institutional and economic interests. Could it be that 
the dirge of non-arbitrability has been sung too soon?142 
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